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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Privatisation the shipping industry in Vietnam:
the benefit, problems and proposals.
Degree: M.S.c
This dissertation is a dedicated effort to study privatisation of the Vietnamese
shipping industry.  Its objectives are to provide the benefit of privatisation in
shipping, to analyse problems of privatisation campaign and to propose some
solutions to make privatisation effective.
The brief concern is taken into the overview of Vietnamese shipping industry, which
has potential demand in the future but is able to supply at the modest level.
It is necessary to take a look of current trends of privatisation in the world in general
and in the international shipping industry in particular.  It is clear that a privatisation
mechanism depends on each country ´s circumstances, hence, the framework of
privatisation in Vietnam is introduced in this paper.
The reasons for inefficiency of state owned enterprises and the benefit of
privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry are investigated.  A comprehensive
analysis of privatisation in a forwarding and agency company is undertaken.
This paper finally examines current trends and emerging problems of privatisation in
the Vietnamese shipping industry.  A number of proposals are made concerning the
efforts for effective privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry.
vKey words: privatisation, efficiency, competition, ownership, share holding,
Vietnam.
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1Chapter 1 
Introduction
Vietnam, a country of long coast line, has considerable potential for development of
the shipping industry.  In fact, the shipping industry has contributed considerably to
reconstruction of the country in the post Vietnam War period.  However, in
comparison with its potential, the present shipping industry in Vietnam has only a
modest position in the national economy because of poor performance, which is
attributed to ineffectiveness and inefficiency.  It resulted due to the central economy
system, which lasted for a long time, leading to bureaucracy and inefficiency of the
national economic mechanism.  Recently, Vietnam has put forth open economic and
institutional reforms in order to develop the national economy and to meet strategic
targets of modernisation and industrialisation periods.  In such circumstances, the
Vietnamese shipping industry needs to reform to cope with new challenges, which
are posed by open economic policy, in a competitive market.  Ownership in the
Vietnamese shipping industry, which faced a lot of problems as other industries in
the country, is considered to change.  Privatisation, also called equitisation in
Vietnam, should be one of the effective treatments for the serious chronic disease in
Vietnamese shipping entities.
1.1 The purpose of study
For political reasons, most shipping companies are state owned companies, which
reflect a great deal of inefficiency.  Privatisation should be considered with other
parallel reforms.  In fact, the Vietnamese government has been aware of the problem
and has actively implemented essential institutional reforms.  This study will focus
on analysing the current privatisation process, specify the difficulties and draw
2conclusions as well as make proposals and recommendations.  Based on the
availability of information, objectives of the paper are as follows:
1. To present the global trends of privatisation in the world economy in general and
in the shipping industry in particular and privatisation in Vietnam;
2. To identify the problems in state owned enterprises in the Vietnamese shipping
industry in terms of ownership, and to argue the benefit of privatisation in the
Vietnamese shipping entities;
3. To analyse problems of privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry and to
make some proposals to facilitate and improve privatisation.
• It is necessary for readers to consider that this dissertation does not intend to
present a comprehensive plan for privatisation in Vietnamese shipping
companies.
1.2 Scope
This Dissertation consists of five chapters that can be summarised as follows:
• Chapter 1: Introduction contains brief introduction, the purpose of study, and
the scope of the study and methodology.  It also describes limitations that the
author has had to cope with while doing this dissertation.
• Chapter 2: Overview of the Vietnamese shipping industry and its prospect
gives a brief introduction of the Vietnamese shipping industry and its
prospect.
• Chapter 3: Global trends of privatisation and privatisation in Vietnam
presents global trends of privatisation and introduces a concrete scenario of
privatisation in Vietnam.
• Chapter 4: The benefit of privatisation the shipping industry in Vietnam and a
case study argues inefficiency in current state owned enterprises and the
benefit of privatisation in the shipping industry.  It also presents the impact of
privatisation in a ship agency and forwarding company.
• Chapter 5: Privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry reviews current
privatisation, identifies the problems and makes some proposals.
3• Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations points out the author ´s view
on privatisation of the shipping industry in Vietnam.
1.3 Methodology
A literary survey was conducted using the library at World Maritime University and
searching machines on Internet.  Staff of a GEMADEPT company and a Saigon
shipping company also provided valuable information.  Intensive research on
privatisation processes, confirmation of ambiguity and complicated problems and
likely solutions were discussed through interviews with many visiting professors and
specialists at World Maritime University.  Extensive understanding and deep
knowledge was also gained and presented by a collection of various views of
distinguished experts from field trips in Denmark, England, Greece, Germany and
Norway. Conclusions and recommendations are made from an independent point of
view.
1.4 Limitations
Privatisation is a wide-ranging topic, which can not be covered in one paper.
Meanwhile, privatisation virtually differs among different countries, which have
different economic and political mechanisms.  So, for the purpose of this dissertation,
the author intentionally covers some relevantly specific aspects of privatisation
related to the shipping industry in Vietnam.  As privatisation is under way the
informative data, which is sensitive, is not plentiful enough to provide a deeper
identification and analysis of privatisation.  On the other hand, due to the author ´s
background as a nautical engineer, the discussion in this dissertation is based on what
he learnt at World Maritime University.  So it is essential to point out that the
dissertation just covers some specific scope of privatisation.
4Chapter 2 
Overview of the Vietnamese shipping industry and its
prospect
This chapter attempts to present the current situation incorporating some analyses of
the Vietnamese maritime industry.  It includes major components of the Vietnamese
maritime organisation system.  For the purpose of the dissertation, the chapter
concentrates on describing and analysing Vietnamese shipping in terms of
commercial aspects and from technical points of view.
2.1 Vietnam maritime organisation
The Ministry of Transport and Communication (MOTC) presently is delegated to
perform the role and function of administration of all forms of transport through
agencies responsible for specific modes, including the Vietnam National Maritime
Bureau (VINAMARINE) for coastal and ocean-going shipping and the Inland
Waterway Bureau for inland waterways.  The interests of the MOTC at a regional
level are served through Provincial District Transport Authorities.  The
VINAMARINE is the authority of state administration of the shipping industry of
Vietnam.  Until January 1996, the VINAMARINE was responsible not only for
regulatory functions in the maritime sector but also for operational management
functions of many ships, ports and shipyards.  The VINAMARINE acted as co-
ordinator of maritime enterprises and assumed governmental responsibility for
managing Vietnamese shipping activities including seaports, merchant fleets,
shipyards, ship servicing companies and registration of ships.
5Now almost all these commercial functions have been transferred to the Vietnam
National Shipping Lines (VINALINES), the state body that now manages ship and
port activities
Figure 1: Organisation system of the Vietnam shipping industry before 1996
Figure 2: Organisation system of the Vietnam shipping industry after 1996
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62.2 The Vietnamese maritime industry
2.2.1 The Vietnamese merchant fleet
1. The Vietnamese merchant fleet has significantly developed in recent years.
Table 1: Distribution of number and dead weight of ships in the Vietnamese fleet
Year Number of ships Dead weight (mt)
1995
1996
1998
1999
497
469
541
549
847 501
799 281.7
1 149 000
1 429 770
(Source Vietnam Register, 2000)
• Thanks to the stable average annual growth of GDP from 1988 to 1998 of about
7,9% (World Bank, 2000) and also the right policy applicable to shipping, the
Vietnamese fleet has had a significant increase in terms of tonnage and number
of ships.
2. However, from the technical point of view, the Vietnamese fleet has a number of
problems that need to be remedied in order to increase their performance to be
efficient and competitive.
Table 2: Ship types of the Vietnamese fleet
No. Ship type Number Gross tonnage Dead-weight
1 Bulk carrier 4 54,983 92,119
2 General dry cargo ship 468 401,053 601,016
3 Container ship 6 62,061 73,918
4 Tanker/Oil tanker 59 205,979 368,551
5 Refrigerated cargo ship 12 7,700 7,373
Total 549 731,776 1,429,770
 (Source: Vietnam Register, 2000)
• It is clear that there is an imbalance in types of ships. The number of general dry
cargo ships is too high in terms of tonnage distribution by type, accounting for
742% against the world distribution of only 10.2% (ISL, 1999).  There are low
percentages of the specialised ships such as container ships, bulk carriers, and
crude oil tankers that can contribute to huge quantities of cargo carrying capacity.
This situation reflects the low level of competitiveness in respect of national
demand for sea borne trade.  Especially, since Vietnam is the world ´s third
biggest exporter of rice - a commodity, which is transported under break bulk
type.  Crude oil is a strategic export commodity, which contributes to the main
income of country.  Recently the quantity of containerised cargoes has increased.
So, from the demand point of view, the Vietnamese fleet should have a larger
number of specialised ships than at present in order to meet national demand.
Table 3: Number of various ship-types in the Vietnamese fleet according to tonnage
No. Ship type <300 GT <500GT <1000 GT <10,000 GT >10,000 GT
1 Bulk carrier 0 0 0 0 4
2 General dry cargo ship 230 120 44 73 1
3 Container ship 0 0 0 4 2
4 Tanker/Oil tanker 18 10 13 13 5
5 Refrigerated cargo
ship
3 3 2 4 0
 (Source: Vietnam Register, 2000)
Table 4: Average age of various ship-types in the Vietnamese fleet according to
tonnage
No. Ship type <300 GT <500GT <1000 GT <10,000 GT >10,000 GT
1 Bulk carrier - - - - 20
2 General dry cargo ship 12.10 12.30 14.64 23.62 11.00
3 Container ship - - - 17.75 18.00
4 Tanker/Oil tanker 17.39 18.20 26.15 20.46 16.40
5 Refrigerated cargo
ship
25.67 29.67 26.00 22.25 -
(Source: Vietnam Register, 2000)
8• As shown in Table 2, the majority number of ships in the fleet is less than 500
GT.  These ships, which use diesel engines and have high operating costs, only
contributed 13,5 % of the national tonnage.  In contrast, the above 500 GT ships
with higher age have a smaller number but are major contributors in terms of
tonnage in the Table 3 and 4.  Nevertheless, these ships are old except one
general dry cargo ship and five tankers in the column for ships above 10000 GT.
They operate with high costs due to intensive repair and maintenance costs and
high insurance premium, which make them inefficient and less competitive.  In
consequence, the Vietnamese fleet is mostly outdated, with low level of modern
automation and specialised control systems.
3. In terms of ownership, there were 175 ship-owners that can be categorised in
three main types:
• State owned companies: there were 67 ship-owners owning 80% of the
Vietnamese fleet in terms of tonnage (VMOTC & JICA, 1997).  Among these are
three large general carriers and one crude oil carrier forming a major part of the
Vietnam national shipping lines (VINALINES), which has a substantial level of
control over the market.  State owned ship-owners, mainly ocean going or
foreign sea going shipping, significantly contribute to the productivity of the
national fleet.
• Provincial owned companies: there were 60 provincial-government shipping
companies, which mainly operate in coastal shipping.  Except three main
provincial shipping companies operating general cargo ships over 2,000 DWT,
other owners solely operate general cargo vessels below 1,000 DWT (up to about
6 ships).  Many of the provincial-government shipping companies are finding it
increasingly difficult to compete in coastal shipping.  Some have reduced their
fleets.  As a result a number of these operators, being significant operators in
shipping, are likely to decline.
• Private companies: Private owners have been developed since the introduction of
economic reforms in 1985.  Most private operators still operate on a small scale.
9Despite the limited capacity of most privately owned vessels, they compete even
on the longer coastal shipping routes.  These owners have been increasingly
investing in the new ship building sector recently.
2.2.2 Seaports
The seaport system can be divided into three types according to the regional
geography.
 Northern seaport system:
There are 15 ports in which Haiphong port is the biggest port.  In 1998 Haiphong
Port served over 1600 ships, handled 5.3 million tonnes of general cargo and 200,000
TEUs.  Haiphong Port’s throughput capacity is planned to reach 6.2 m tons by 2000,
including 250,000 TEUs of containerised cargo according to the Vietnam Port
Association (VPA).
Central seaport system:
There are 24 ports with a cargo throughput of ten million tons expected by the year
2000.  Danang Port is the biggest port in the system with cargo throughput in 1998
reaching 848,000 tons.  Demand for port usage in Danang is growing rapidly and the
throughput after the year 2000 is expected to go to two million tons per year (VPA,
1999).
Southern seaport system:
The southern seaport system, which includes 13 ports, has a significant role in the
nation’s sea transport industry due to favourable geographic and economic
conditions.  Saigon Port is the biggest of all and Vietnam´s busiest port, handling 7.4
million tons in 1998.  The average river depth from 8.5 to 11 meters allows ships
from 20,000 d.w.t to 30,000 d.w.t to enter the port.  According to statistics by the
Southern Centre for Traffic and Transportation Economic Science, after the year
2000, Saigon Port will reach a throughput of thirteen to fifteen million tons per year.
Furthermore, some twenty other provincial ports are being administered and operated
independently by the local authorities.
According to the annual VINAMARINE report in 1999, the throughput cargo
volume handled by all port was 56.8 million tons, an increase 40% as compared with
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1996 figures.  The reason for this achievement, besides the effort of the staff in the
organisation, has been the remarkable investment from government to upgrade
infrastructure, to build specialised quays, channels, buoys, and lighthouses to
facilitate for vessels entering safely.  Currently, the Vietnam Port Association is
undertaking the improvement scheme, including the increase of handling capacity,
port management, and intermodal transport facilities (Vu, 1999).  In the period of
2000-2010, Vietnam will mainly concentrate on the capital to build deep seaports at
the main economic area to accept vessels with over 20,000 DWT and to set up
container terminals soon.  On the other hand, it will build specialised ports, break
bulk ports and tanker terminals in the central industrial areas.  Furthermore, it will
also set up the local satellite ports, with the small-scale investment to receive and
transfer domestically from the bigger ports to serve the local economy (VPA, 1999).
2.2.3 Shipbuilding and ship repair yards in Vietnam
There are 59 shipbuilding and repairing yards with new building and repairing
capacities appropriate for 40000 DWT and 105000 DWT respectively. Most of these
yards are controlled by the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, established
in 1996 under the direct management of MOTC.  The navy administrates the others.
The seven major shipyards in Vietnam are listed as follows:
Table 5: Major shipyards in Vietnam
No Shipyard New-building
capacity(DWT)
Repairing capacity
(DWT)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Bach Dang shipyard
Ha Long shipyard
Ben Kien shipyard
Pha Rung ship repairing yard
Ba Son ship repairing yard
Saigon ship building
Ship-oil platform repairing yard
6,500
5,000
1,500
-
-
1,000
-
8,000
3,500
2,000
16,000
15,000
4,000
10,000
(Source: Vietnam Register, 1997)
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At present, the maximum shipbuilding capacity in Vietnamese shipyards is 6,500
DWT while most of the ships domestically built are less than 1,000 DWT.
According to the Japanese expert team for Coastal Shipping Rehabilitation and
Development Project in Vietnam in 1997 (MOTC & JICA, 1997), there was
technical backwardness at Vietnamese shipyards in terms of production efficiency
and quality control.  It also recommended the problem should be considered and
solved if Vietnam wants to be competitive in the international markets of
shipbuilding and ship repair industries.  In response to the recommendation, in the
master plan of shipping and repair yards development from 2000-2010, Vietnamese
shipbuilding and ship repair yards require 267 million USD in order to expand and
upgrade their status.
2. 3  Vietnamese shipping prospect
According to the World Fact Book, Vietnam has a long coast line measuring up to
3,444 kilometres, excluding the islands. Furthermore, Vietnam has a large inland
waterway network which is approximately 40,000 kilometres long, including 11,000
kilometres of sufficient depth for inland transportation (Vietnam Ministry of
Transport, 1995). Thanks to favourable geographical configuration, Vietnamese
potential in shipping is very huge.  In the purpose of viewing the Vietnamese
shipping vision the author considers it an opportunity to develop Vietnamese
shipping in terms of demand and supply.
2.3.1 Demand
Economic factors are considered as the basis for an effective development of
Vietnamese shipping.  The Vietnamese economy has achieved significant results
during implementation of "The strategy on stabilisation and socio-economic
development up to the year of 2000" (APEC, 1999).  Average economic growth
reached 8.7 % per annual during 1996-1999, which has facilitated the improvement
in the population's living standards.  The ‘open’ economic policy has achieved
significant results, which have promoted trade liberation and foreign direct
investment.
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Table 6: Vietnam's economic indexes (%)
YearItem
1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP growth
Export growth
Import growth
9.3
41
38.9
8.2
22,2
-1.6
4.0
3.9
-2.3
3.7
5,0
-3
(Source: Saigon Time, 2000)
Presently the volume of the country’s sea borne trade increase is attribute to mainly
three strategic export goods, which significantly contribute to the national income.
These are rice, coal and crude oil with a distribution of 3.8 million tons, 3 million
tons and 11.5 million tons in 1999 respectively.  Other commodities such as rubber,
sea food and garment product are around 3 million tons.
Vietnam imports a wide variety of products.  Some of the larger volume import
commodities are steel, fertiliser, gasoline, cement, clinker, motorbikes, chemicals
and pharmaceuticals products.  The imports have been growing due to domestic
demand in the industrialisation and modernisation period.  Table 7 shows the volume
of sea borne trade through Vietnamese seaports.
 Table 7: The volume of sea borne trade through Vietnamese seaports
No Unit 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 Container TEU 315 134 464 849 760 610 799 665
2 Liquid cargoes Ton 13 180 000 15 510 642 18 126 701 21 889 442
3 Dry general
cargo
Ton 14 470 000 17 522 766 20 927 308 23 123 193
4 Transit cargo ton - 2 085 160 3 150 506 4 038 619
Total 34 000 000 36 656 337 45 760 326 56 899 006
 (Source: VINAMARINE 1999)
Shipping is much more important to the Vietnamese economy if considering the
maritime dependence factor (MDF) which is defined as a Percentage Sea Borne
13
Trade in value per GDP.  Table 8 shows much more Vietnam’s economic
dependence on shipping.
Table 8: Maritime dependence factor
Country MDF Country MDF
1.Singapore
2. Malaysia
3.Thailand
4. UAE
5.Tunisia
179%
131%
95%
90%
70%
6.The Philippines
7.Vietnam
8.Korea
9.Saudi  Arabia
10.Tanzania
62%
61%
60 %
58%
54%
(Source: Ma, 1999)
There will be an increase of sea borne trade. Asian Development Bank (2000)
forecasts the increase of the Vietnamese economy in 2000-2001 periods 5% and 6%
respectively.  Based on the macroeconomic indicators VINAMARINE (1999)
forecasts the increase of sea borne trade through Vietnamese ports for the 2005-2010
period.  The volume of sea borne trade will reach 125,170 thousand tons in 2010 as
Table 9 shows.
Table 9: Forecast of Vietnam sea borne trade
Items 2005 (thousand tons) 2010 (thousand tons)
Export 38 000 80 370
Import 23 880 44 800
Total 61 880 125 170
(Source: VINAMARINE, 1999)
2.3.2 Supply
Historically, the Vietnamese fleet dominated a modest share in the Vietnamese
shipping market of about 10% (VINAMARINE, 1995).  Although the Vietnamese
shipping industry has striven to dominate the market, Vietnamese shipping
companies in 1999 transported only 13.4% of the total volume of import-export
cargoes (VINAMARINE, 2000).  In terms of import cargo, the Vietnamese shipping
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fleet carried only 1.1 million tons of rice, 51,000 tons of coal and 600,000 tons of
crude oil against the total export volume of 3.8 million tons, three million tons and
11.5 million tons of the above commodities respectively.  As mentioned earlier, the
Vietnamese fleet is quite old and technically backward.  In the fleet structure there is
an imbalance between dead-weight capacity and types of vessels, not appropriate for
the major kinds of cargo.  The fleet seriously lacks specialised vessels, especially
container ships and tankers, bulk carriers.
In order to be active in the domestic shipping market, the Vietnamese government
have drawn a planned target of handling export/import cargoes for the years
2000,2005,2010: 20%, 30%, 40%; and handling well 99% North -South domestic
cargo.  However, to reach its targets the Vietnamese shipping industry expects to
develop its fleet, to be able to carry the cargo volume as follows:
Table 10: Targets of the Vietnamese fleet up to 2010
Year
2005 2010
Container fleet (TEU) 9 880 24 990
Tanker fleet(DWT) 2,263,200 3,241,000
Conventional fleet(DWT) 218850 224,280
Break bulk fleet (DWT) 136 940 291,700
Coastal fleet (DWT) 705,880 1,764,705
 (Source: VIETNAMARINE, 1999)
To reach the above expectation, the Vietnamese shipping industry proposed investing
budget allocation according to the following:
Table 11: Financial investment for the Vietnamese fleet.
2005 2010
Budget (million USD) 318.1 294.124
(Source: VIETNAMARINE, 1999)
There are some possibilities for the Vietnamese shipping industry to mobilise capital,
in addition to some its own capital:
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• Loan from banks
• Selling stakes
• Join venture co-operation
For such finance, the Vietnamese shipping industry should obtain credit, which
requires it to improve its performance in respect of competitiveness and efficiency.
So, the institutional reforms in the Vietnamese shipping industry should take place in
order to overcome such challenges in the future.
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Chapter 3 
Global trends of privatisation and privatisation in Vietnam
Privatisation has probably been the most significant global economic phenomenon of
the last 20 years.  In the late 1980s and 1990s, due to globalisation in world trade,
open economy and the collapse of East European socialist countries, led to a wide
restructuring.  Privatisation has become popular and increased.  For the purpose of
dissertation, this chapter will present global trends of privatisation in the world in
general and in the shipping industry in particular.  Then, the author presents the
concrete scenario of privatisation in Vietnam.
3.1 Global trends of privatisation in several regions
The phenomenon of privatisation has happened in both developed and developing
countries for the last two decades.  The number of privatisation transactions has been
growing over the years.  According to Shafik (1996) between 1988 and 1993 there
were more than 2,600 transactions in 95 countries, yielding USD 271 billion.  In
consideration of Vietnamese geography and economy, it is necessary to take into
account privatisation in Asia, where Vietnam is located, and in Eastern Europe,
where there has been a similar economic situation to the Vietnamese economy during
the beginning phase of privatisation.
3.1.1 Asia
Privatisation in Asia has taken place with force, left rich experience and reached
achievement in the decade of 1990.  Privatisation in the region actually includes a
wide range of methods, forms and approaches to shift economic activities from the
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state to the private sector (UNDP, 1999).  Experience from privatisation in Asia
clarified that privatisation can work under a well definition legal framework, which
is formalised, transparent, formal and accepted by those subject to them.  Due to
history, law, culture, social, political and economic factors privatisation happened
quite different in each country.  However, there was a common feature of
privatisation in East Asian countries namely that the governments retain over major
enterprises.
3.1.2 East European countries and former Soviet Union countries
UNCTAD (1994) pointed out that state owned enterprises in East European countries
operated with lack of priority for efficiency considerations so their operations were
costly.  Privatisation, which brings economic efficiency, was to foster trade liberation
in these countries.  At the beginning of privatisation a number of new private
enterprises entered into sectors, which reserved state owned enterprises before.  Most
of them were low–capital enterprises and operated in the light industry and service
sectors.  The global trend of privatisation in such countries is that a large percentage
of shares belongs to insiders, such as managers and employees, because the goal of
completing privatisation is carried quickly by mass distribution of shares (Brown,
1998).  Some experiences of privatisation in such countries showed that the best
mechanism for privatisation is the entry of new private enterprises.  Another
experience is that institutional reforms in the economy should be carried out at the
beginning phase (Luis, 1997).  These experiences are very useful for Vietnam to
implement a privatisation policy.
3.2 Privatisation in the shipping industry
3.2.1 Privatisation in shipping lines
Towards the end of the 1980s maritime analysis drew totally different views between
state owned enterprises and private enterprises.  In developed countries during that
time there was costly government involvement in shipping.  In developing countries,
the situation of state owned enterprises was worse.  It was common phenomena in
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these countries that state owned enterprises were reserved privileged rights of cargo
space by protection method such as bilateral 50-50 cargo-sharing treaties,
enforcement of UNCTAD formula 40-40-20, favourable port and tax treatment.
Although the state owned enterprises received economic and fiscal incentives, they
were less competitive and inefficient due to their poor performance.  In shipping
state owned enterprises, there was mostly a serious chronic labour problem, which
resulted in high cost. In some cases the governments invested huge amounts of
money to build expensive fleets with big and fast ships but the result was modest due
to lack of cargo space, for example Brazil’s Lloyd Brasiliero (Eyre, 1990).  Shipping
state owned enterprises contained hidden problems, which floated when they were
sold in public.  The typical example is New Zealand lines, when in 1980s it
encountered problem to find suitable buyers.  Most of them performed poor with
high costs, over manning and even, one of them was in a critical financial situation –
nearly bankrupt.  In contrast, privately owned enterprises operate on the basis of
price signals satisfying supply and demand.  Private executors consider cost
effectiveness rather than social and political objectives.  As a result, private
enterprises can supply high quality services with low costs.
On the other hand, arguments to support state owned enterprises in shipping became
obsolete.  Basically, state owned shipping lines were based on the following reasons:
• To try and reserve cargo space for domestic transport operators
• To promote their shipyards
• To address political matters
For the first reason, most governments believed that by protecting of transport rights
for export-import operations they would raise the profit and revenue.  However, the
poor performance of domestic operators made their domestic importers and exporters
loose profit, if alternatively the foreign carriers were considered. In fact, in
developing countries, the majority of the cargo-carrying shares belonged to foreign
carriers, who have had good quality services.  For the second reason, governments
helped the domestic shipping industry by integrated solution whereby governments
developed domestic fleets and shipyards in parallel. However, fleet development
19
schemes implied a financial burden due to the high cost of shipbuilding and poor
performance of shipping operations.  For the third reason, in the past governments
believed that by developing national fleets, dependence capacity was raised.
However, the need for specialisation in shipping spelt out separate types of
challenges and the implication of collapse of socialist East European countries made
the idea become obsolete.
It is clear that the privatisation trend in shipping lines was necessary to bring
efficiency.  In fact, after the collapse of socialist European countries, privatisation
was widely applied.  In such countries, similarities in shipping structures that could
be found were centralised management, insufficient investment and overstaff both
shore and ship based.  Privatisation in these countries was carried out on a large
scale.  The privatisation process went hand in hand with fundamental reorientation in
fleet strategies and service configuration (Seck, 1998).
3.2.2 Privatisation in ports
The situation in port activities is the same as in shipping lines.  In most of the cases,
governments invested huge amount of money to build port infrastructure but got a
modest achievement from state owned port activities.  Eyre (1990, p.115) stated
“ports run entirely by state are more expensive and less efficient”.  From the 1980s, a
compromised solution for state owned ports against inefficiency has been to leave
port operations for private sectors by leasing or contracting out.
In the 1990s, due to containerisation and globalisation, ports globally have required
upgrading and modernisation in order to meet the breakthrough demand of sea-borne
trade.  Application of new technology especially in container handling equipment
and port structure implied new institutional reforms and major investments.  More
over, mostly in developing countries, governments have already experienced the
burden of rising fiscal deficit of hungry port projects in the past.  As a result, the lack
of public funds or the refusal of governments to make funds available for investment
in modernisation and expansion of terminals has result in an increased need for
private capital investment (Marge, 1997).  So privatisation in ports is an inevitable
consequence of port development.  In fact, involvement of private sectors in all the
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port activities, even in development of ports, has brought updated techniques, higher
productivity and a means of resource generation.  Under these circumstances,
privatisation in ports helps governments save foreign exchange, give a chance to
expand trade, carry out industrial development and avoid port congestion.
Shashikumar (1998, p.47) concluded  “the involvement of a private operator to run
its new state-of-the-art container terminal is epoch-making by any measure, and
amounts to a psychological breakthrough in the nation’s port planning, development,
and operations”.
3.2.3 Privatisation in shipbuilding and ship yards:
Shipbuilding and shipyards are also a hungry financial sector, which requires from
governments huge money investments.  Operating this sector needs modern
technology upgrading and innovation.  State owned enterprises in this sector were
normally passive and backward in comparison with international techniques.
Privatisation in shipbuilding and ship-repair yards brought a chance to import
managerial experience of foreign investors and to attract financial support for
newbuilding programmes. The starting point and motivation of privatisation in the
sector definitely varied among cases.  For Bulgarian and Romanian yards in 1998,
low labour costs attracted foreign investors.  In fact, participation of foreign investors
in those shipyards brought significant cash flow and high technology, improved their
performance and productivity, and diversified their products according to
(“Privatisation gets”, 1998).  For Spain, privatisation aimed at encouragement of
worker ´s involvement to improve shipyard performance.  In fact, workers can seek
benefits by buying shares and become more interested in the common fruit (“Spain ‘s
privatisation”, 1998).
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3.3 Privatisation in Vietnam
3.3.1 Objectives and frameworks for privatisation in Vietnam
 3.3.1.1 Objectives
Decree 44 stated objectives of the privatisation programme as follows:
• Transformation of non-strategic small and medium sized state enterprises into
joint stock companies in order to mobilise capital from employees and outside
investors for the purposes of investing in technological renovation, modernisation
and development of Vietnam, creating more jobs, expanding and improving the
competitiveness of Vietnamese economy and changing the structure of State
owned enterprises
• Giving opportunities for enterprise employees and outside investors to own
shares and play the role of real owners, thereby creating incentives for increasing
the efficiency of the employees and the enterprise, enlarging the properties of the
state and contributing to the growth of the national economy.
3.3.1.2 Economic framework
• Premise for open economy :
Before the economic renovation started in the mid-1980s, Vietnam had followed a
model of centrally planned economy.  The State owned almost all production
measures, established state-owned enterprises in all sectors, subsidised co-operatives,
and restrained developments of private and household sectors.  Since 1986 - under
the “Doimoi” (renovation) policy of Sixth Party Congress - Vietnam has carried out
the most comprehensive and profound economic renovation in its modern history.
This renovation, aimed at creating the fundamental conditions for economic
development, has already helped Vietnam overcome serious difficulties and a
substantial progress has been achieved.
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•  State enterprise reform and current matters:
In order to reinforce the state sector the Prime Minister stipulated Decision 90 and 91
in March 1994 to establish state corporations.  Decision 90 called for establishment
of State Corporation with at least five state owned enterprise members and minimum
VND 100 billion in legal capital (currently about USD 70900).  Decision 91 called
for formation of much larger corporation of VND 1000 billion (currently about USD
709000). With the government ´s will of higher efficiency, state entities attempted to
merge a number of state owned enterprises into big corporations following incentive
actions such as delivery capital and autonomy.
In the effort for state enterprise reforms, the government enacted the law on state
enterprise in April 1995.  Following that, the government undertook re-registration of
state owned enterprises and reduced their total number from 12,000 to 6,000.
According to the new law, state owned enterprises have full autonomy,
accountability for their decisions and actions and are audited by a competent state
agency according to Vietnam General Statistic Organisation (VGSO, 1999).
However, the state sectors still remain chronic problems, which require deep and
wide spread reforms.  Most of the foreign economic experts consider the state sector
containing debts and inefficiency, a political bias toward State owned enterprises
investment, trade and allocation of public funds and credit (World Bank, 1999).
VGSO (1999) clarified 300 of 6000 State owned enterprises in operation providing
80% of the state revenues from enterprises. 60% of the remaining State owned
enterprises were in debt, unprofitable and non-competitive.   The state sector absorbs
more than 75 % of bank credits and much of the state ´s budget.
• Private sector development:
Before the renovation policy was applied, the private sector had limited scope to
develop and was mainly household enterprises. Thanks to the “Doi Moi” policy, the
private sector has freely extended in terms of forms and scope of operation.
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Especially, in the 1990s privately owned enterprises have grown and multiplied very
rapidly from a very small base to a share equivalent to roughly 40 % of GDP.
The development of private enterprises especially small and medium-sized
companies is vitally important to Vietnam long-term development. The argument for
the idea is that Vietnam has comparative advantage of human resources.  So,
Vietnam can rapidly achieve long-term growth via an export-oriented
industrialisation strategy.  Furthermore, in export-oriented industrialisation, small
and medium sized private companies show their advantages, such as superior
efficiency and profitability  (Mekong Project Development Facility, 1999).
Table 12: Privatise sector contribution in GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998
Outcome
(billion of VND)
85071.21 91306.26 96436.25 121635.8
Share 43.5% 42.7% 41.7% 44.1%
Growth 8.8% 7.3% 5.7% 4.3%
(Source: VGSO, 1999)
•  Stock market in Vietnam:
Vietnam's first Stock Exchange Centre (SEC) will open in Hochiminh City at the end
of 2000.  After that another one is also planned to open in Hanoi.  This event will be
warmly welcomed by local joint stock companies looking to raise capital, and by
local and foreign investors wishing to invest funds in Vietnam.  It is believed that the
SECs will facilitate privatisation of larger state owned enterprises (“Vietnam´s
Securities”, 2000).
The procedure for setting up a market for trading securities in Vietnam has been
prepared for a long time. In late 1996 the government established the State Securities
Commission.  However, until mid 1998 the government issued regulations on the
securities market and on the establishment and operation of SECs.
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3.3.1.3  Legal framework
• Legal system:
The Constitution of 1992 has legalised the economic reforms and recognised the
freedom of business.  Private entities are freely operated in all economic activities in
which there is no restriction on capital and labour employed. The Constitution also
recognised essential principles of the market economy, and thus has set up the legal
environment for the more comprehensive economic reform. In fact, it has offered a
legal basis such as promulgating legal documents for property ownership, different
types of enterprises and legal mechanisms including legal institutions and settlement
processes.  The legal framework in Vietnam has changed dramatically with the
promulgation of the Constitution of 1992 and the passage of nearly 100 laws (Dao,
1997). These laws, though not yet sufficient, have provided the main legal
framework for the market economy, the market institutions and mechanisms, rights
on property and ownership, the role and function of the state, and the necessary legal
institutions.
• Legal documents related to privatisation:
Recognising that the legal environment is the most important matter not only for
market mechanism operation in general but for institutional reforms like privatisation
in particular, the Vietnamese government has enacted a series of legal documents
which are essential for free trade, competition and privatisation.  In general, Vietnam
has prepared an available legal framework for privatisation such as labour law,
Foreign Direct Investment law, the company law and the contract law.  These laws
have been stipulated and/or revised in recent years for suitability with economic
reforms.  The labour law was promulgated in 1994, the investment incentive law was
promulgated in 1994 and modified in 1998, the company law promulgated in 1990
and modified in 1994, the contract law promulgated in 1990.
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3.3.2 Processes and methods for privatisation in Vietnam
3.3.2.1 Privatisation process in Vietnam:
According to Decree 44, the privatisation process in Vietnam is summarised as
follows:
1. Agencies of the government that control state owned enterprises such as
ministries, ministerial-level institutions, people’s Committees and state
corporations shall establish Enterprise Reforms Committees (ERCs) which steer
privatisation.  It shall also decide which enterprise segments and enterprises
should be privatised, send the list to Central Enterprise Reform Committee; issue
the decision to set up the Enterprise Privatisation Board (EPB); and provide
training for privatisation board members and concerned enterprise officials.
2. The enterprise privatisation board (EPB) will prepare all information required
from the enterprise ´s financial statements, a managerial report, an inventory of
assets to an estimate of expenditures for privatisation. The EPB shall popularise
the government ´s privatisation policies and regulations to the workforce.
• An accredited auditing firm shall audit the accounts of the enterprise. The EPB
determines the enterprise value and submits it to the controlling agency, central
enterprise reform committee (CERC).
3. The controlling agency, CERC, shall appraise EPB's submission and send it to
the Ministry of Finance  (MOF).
• Besides, EPB shall prepare and publicise a 3- 5 years business plan for post-
privatisation and a draft plan for (i) cash distribution of reward and welfare
funds, (ii) determining the amount of credit available to each employee for share
purchase.
• EPB shall submit the finalised privatisation plan and the draft joint stock
company´s statute to the controlling agency for approval and the comments. The
ERC shall propose nominees to represent the state shareholding on the board of
26
management of the joint stock company and issue the decision to transform the
state enterprise into a joint stock company.
Figure 3: Privatisation process in Vietnam
3.3.2.2  Methods and forms of privatisation in Vietnam
• Methods of privatisation:
For the time being, the method of privatisation applicable in Vietnam is popular
public issue or offer. This may be a full or a partial sale of shares to the general
public.  Presently, there is no existence of the stock market, which hopefully is
expected to open by the end of year 2000.  Presently, shares are offered to
employees, small domestic investors and foreign investors with the limitation of
shares for respective investors.  When the stock exchange centres are set up with the
business being quoted on the stock exchange the shares will be really open for
trading.   Thomas (1994) pointed out the advantage of this method normally raises
the highest price for the assets and secures the widest possible share ownership.  It
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also shares the offered premium between the largest number of people.  The broad
share ownership base also makes the company difficult to be taken over.  The major
disadvantage of this method is that since the shares are freely traded the company
could fall into the hands of competitors or even foreign-owned companies. The
procedure can only be pursued by large businesses because of the expense incurred
in management fees and promotional costs.
•  Forms of privatisation in Vietnam:
Decree 44 prescribes four ways in which a state owned enterprise may be converted
into a joint-stock company:
• leaving the existing capital of the enterprise  unchanged and mobilising more
funds by issuing  shares, in other words increasing capital;
• selling a portion of the enterprise's existing  capital to new shareholders;
• turning off as a new entity a section, department or division of an state owned
enterprise, which on a stand-alone basis meets the requirements for
privatisation; or
• converting into a joint-stock company  (100% privately owned). The state
retains no share in the new company.
3.3.3. Enterprise valuation
According to Decree 44, the actual value of the enterprise at the time of privatisation
is stated to be the price of all existing properties of the enterprise acceptable to both
the seller and the buyer. The actual value of the state-owned capital of an enterprise
is the actual value less the liabilities.
The enterprise's actual value is calculated on the basis of the following factors:
• Data and records contained in the books of accounts of the enterprise at the time
of privatisation.
• The quality, technical characteristics, buyer’s need for the assets and the market
price of the  assets.
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• The business advantages of the enterprise in terms of its geographical location
and the company’s reputation.  The business advantages should be reflected by
the return on average working capital (not working capital in the business sense)
in the three years before privatisation.  The value of this factor is to be minimum
and maximum to 30% of the total.
3.4.  Current scenario of privatisation in Vietnam
The privatisation process for state owned enterprises in Vietnam has so far reached a
reasonable success.  By the end of 1999, there were 370 state owned enterprises
nation- wide completely privatised with the mobilisation capital up to VND 1 trillion
(currently about USD 70.9 million).  Most privatised state owned enterprises have
adapted to the new production and business environment and shown positive results
in improving workers´s lives.  According to a survey from the Central Committee for
Enterprise Reform on the privatised state owned enterprises for last year, average
turnover increased by 39 %, pre-tax profit reached 17.5 %, salary increased around
one per cent.  Share dividends ranged between 6 and 24 %.  Thousands of new jobs
were created  (“Vietnam to Equitise”, 2000).
However, this process has still been slow in comparison to the government target in
which there were 400 state owned enterprises to be privatised in 1999.  There are
some reasons, summarised in the following, which prevented the privatisation to
speed up:
Managerial problems: poor management
Financial problems: long-term domestic or foreign debts, over due account
receivable and over due fiscal debts
Political problem: constraint from top management and provincial leaders
Regulatory systems: lengthy and cumbersome privatisation process, the restriction
access for joint stock companies (Tran,  2000).
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Chapter 4 
The benefit of privatisation in the Vietnamese industry and a
case study
4.1  Current  inefficiency in  state owned enterprises in the Vietnamese
shipping industry
From ownership point of view, state owned enterprises in the Vietnamese shipping
industry contain a number of listed problems.
4.1.1 Multiple objectives
• In addition to economic objectives, state owned shipping enterprises in Vietnam
have political and social objectives.  In order to satisfy a number of interests,
state owned enterprises under enforcement of the central government or
provincial council set up their objectives, which are too general to be carried out
or may combine a number of controversial objectives.  In illustration, the plan of
VINALINES for the 21st century states its objectives “ contributing VINALINES
become a co-operation with average capital level in South East Asia region
having advanced technology and effective operation in order to co-operate and
share market with leading companies in Asia”.  The assignment of the ambitious
goals is a burden for VINALINES in consideration of their limited potential with
a market share as low as 10% in the ocean and foreign going shipping around and
a merchant fleet having an average age around 17 years.  Considering advanced
technology aspects, it implies that VINALINES invest a significant budget to
upgrade the fleet and influence their freight rates offered in the market in short
term and return of equity in long term.  So, the technical objective is not in
consistency with the competitiveness and financial objectives.  Sheshinski and
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Lopez-Calva (1999) point out that “Not only are the managers' objectives
distorted, but the budget constraints they face are also softened”.  So, setting
multiple objectives creates distortions in the allocation and use of resources.  It
ultimately leads to counter- productive results and unintended side effects in state
owned enterprises.
• From a political point of view, state owned shipping enterprises concern
egalitarian employment under Vietnam government enforcement.   Edgren
(1990) noted employment and efficient objectives in state owned shipping
enterprises might be hard to satisfy whether or not they are given in general with
no limitation.  Actually, in Vietnam, managers have certain privileges to avoid
their responsibility in case of loss benefit because when objectives are unclear or
inconsistent the managers have freedom in interpretation to their faults.  In case
the profit is not reached, managers can be blamed on the egalitarian objective.  If
social objectives are not put into effect, managers can be blamed on the efficient
objectives.  As a result, most of state owned shipping enterprises in Vietnam are
unaccountability.
4.1.2 Poor planning
• The planning division, a vital part in an organisation like a shipping company, is
very weakly represented in most state owned enterprises in Vietnam.  In most of
the cases, it is very hard for an observer to see a clear scope of responsibilities in
terms of reports and information in shipping state owned enterprises (MOTC &
JRCI, 1997).  Mainly, there are two reasons for poor planning in state owned
enterprises.  First, there is lack of relevant information for planning such as
traffic forecasting and market research.  Second, the inadequacy of skilled
managers as discussed below, can not draw creditable plans in consideration of
vessel scheduling and allocation methods, vessel acquisition planning, and
strategy for cost control.
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4.1.3 Poor appropriation of finance
• Due to the organisation structure of shipping state owned enterprises in Vietnam,
the executive manager and board of directors have limitation of decision making
for new investments.  Planning the new investment and raising funds for it must
comply with very strict regulations and procedures.  It is rare for them to make a
final decision for a loan even using state owned enterprises’ earning as a major
investment in a project.  Normally, the proposal will be submitted to MOTC for
approval.  Moreover, granting for the approval is based not only on the criteria
that are related to the expected economic return on the investment but also on
various external and non-economic factors.  Political interference is normal
business in state owned enterprises.  For instance, in 1997 the government
granted the Vietnam Ocean Shipping Company (VOSCO) budget to build two
6500 dwt general cargo ships in Vietnam.  According to statistical analysis, the
price that VOSCO had to pay to a domestic ship yard is higher by more than 5 %
that Japanese shipyards for those ships and the time for construction is longer in
comparison with Japanese shipyards.  However VOSCO had to accept higher
cost under the pressure of controlling agencies like MOTC and MOF; but, in
turn, easily got funding granted.
• It is inconvenient and complicated for shipping state owned enterprises to draw
up investment plans because investment planning and feasibility studies should
combine political and bureaucratic lobbyism to ensure the project granted.
Therefore, uncertain decision–making process has strong influence to systematic
planning of state shipping companies.  It leads to lowering the effectiveness of
state shipping companies in general, and the productivity of capital in particular
(Edgren, 1990).
4.1.4 Inappropriate control and monitoring systems
• Another constraint, which shipping state owned enterprises have faced, is an
imperfect system of audit, control and monitoring.  In order to understand how it
works it is essential to take a look the following figures.
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Figure 4: Operational report
Figure 5: Annual report
• The monitoring system operation seems to be good, but in reality it contains a
number of problems.  First, the system can not work effectively and efficiently
due to the fact that state owned enterprises are not fully operated in the market.
The low threat of take over leads to the poor monitoring function among state
owned enterprise ‘s managers.  Sheski and Lopez-Calva (1999, p.8) specified
“Debt markets can not play the role of disciplining the managers, because state
owned enterprise's debt is actually public debt that is perceived and traded under
different conditions”.  So, state owned enterprise managers are likely to exist in
any level of performance even in financial distress because of state subsidy
policy.  On the other hand, the government could withdraw its protection for state
owned enterprises but the political cost of state owned enterprises going bankrupt
is more serious than the protection cost.  Seemingly, the state prefers to give state
owned enterprises its protection, which partly make them weaker.
• Second, this system is not transparent in the sense that all information about
financial statements is kept secret, can not be observed and be accessible to
employees or outsiders, who are interested in doing business with them.  The
effects of this are employees loosing motivation incentives and bringing in
opportunity for corruption.  The former effect shows that there is no motivation
to employees when employees do not know what they have done for the
enterprise and the future perspective of the enterprise.  The latter effect results in
popular corruption in state owned enterprise.
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• Third, this system is complicated and tied by complicated and a long regulatory
system.  It leads to the situation in which managers can not access straight away
financial information and estimate use of an opportunity to increase profits.  The
control system is difficult, if not impossible; to appraise the effectiveness of total
resources used, including capital and labour.
• Finally, from strategic economy point of view, the system being a close system
with outsiders as investors, financiers and other interested entities confine the
opportunities to expand enterprise business.  Under current circumstances of
global shipping as a high competition, the corporate relation with outsiders
principally has a positive effect to develop an enterprise in terms of global level.
On the other hand, the disclosure of financial statement is essential to bring the
concerns of outsiders (Chopping & Powell, 1996).  So, eventually the close
system results in a restriction to enterprise development.
4.1.5 Weak organisational structure regarding marketing and customer relations
• Due to the central democracy regime that has been applied in state owned
shipping enterprises, there is no clear border of rights and responsibilities among
divisions and staff.  The concept of “community responsibility” has existed and it
seems that senior staff, such as managers, can avoid their responsibility in case of
negligence.  Moreover, the weak links among departments also lead to failure of
co-operation to implement strategic plans.
• Especially, the critical problem is that in state owned shipping enterprises
marketing and consideration of customers’ interests are weak.  From managerial
point of view, marketing divisions, which are in charge of performing cargo
canvassing and maintaining good customer relationships, are a vital part of the
business department of shipping companies.  But they are very weak in Vietnam
shipping companies (VMOTC & JICA, 1997).  There are several reasons for the
weakness. Traditionally, managers in state owned enterprises carry out business
according to planned economic principles that concentrate on pre-defined
objectives basis rather than market needs basis.  The limitation of managers’
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vision and the lack of motivated personnel in state owned enterprises also prevent
the implementation of ambitious marketing plans.
4.1.6 Inadequate management
Another chronic weakness in state owned shipping enterprises is management
inadequacy for internal and external reasons:
• First, staff in state owned enterprises mainly have insufficient experience in
marketing, providing customer service, financing investment and accounting.
Furthermore, the Japanese expert team (VMOTC & JICA, 1997) stated “shipping
operators in State owned enterprises have little or no experience of operating
specialised vessel (container or semi container, RoRo) or developing scheduled
liner service”.
• Second, the rapid changes caused by economic reforms are causing reasonable
difficulties for the existing management who have insufficient experience or
expertise in the new ways of carrying out business.  There are a number of
uncertainties, which have been created by the difficulty in estimating future
expected traffic, unclear government policy and the continued development of
new laws and regulations.
4.1.7 Lack of know-how
• The problem of lack of know-how is specified in many official reports of
VINAMARINE.  This is a constraint for developing improved management
methods, meeting international safety standards for shipping and competing in
the international market.  In the author ´s belief, training schemes and employee
incentives, which are scarce in state owned enterprises, are solutions to upgrade
the level of know-how.  Actually, in state owned enterprises, training schemes
are not considered as strategic actions.  In fact there is lack of comprehensive
introductions to implement them at operation levels and providing budget
reservation for them.  On the other hand, practically, there is no employee
incentive in state owned enterprise mechanism.  Hence, employees under such
obsolete mechanism seem to be left behind in the changing business
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environment.  Especially, under the information technology boom, the progress
of technology requires endless employees’ efforts in upgrading their level of
know-how in order to survive in the competitive market.
4.1.8 Poor performance: overstaff, low productivity
• Overstaff
Taking into consideration availability of staff there is an overstaff phenomena in
state owned enterprises. The following table shows the staff per ship comparison
between BIMCO members and Vietnamese state owned shipping enterprises.  The
figure of BIMCO members was sought out from Professor Mottram in the MASSOP
project.
Table 13: Average staff in the Vietnamese shipping industry.
Company sizeAverage staff
Per ship Small(4-5 ships) Medium(6-20 ships) Big(over 20 ships)
BIMCO members 3.33 2.15 1.78
Vietnamese
shipping companies
5.2 4.6 _
(Source: Mottram, 1999)
There are several reasons to explain such problems.
First, the egalitarian objective prompts this chronic problem for state owned shipping
enterprises. In Vietnamese state owned shipping enterprises, managers must maintain
employment, considered as a criterion, which determines the competence of
managers and the achievement of enterprises.  Moreover, employment problems are
subjects to be examined by higher level management such as ministry or provincial
committee and through strict regulation.
Second, the prevailing thinking is psychological inducement in which the top
management tries to run for achievement.  Managers in state owned enterprise tend
to achieve higher targets in coming years without concerns for future market.  In
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consequence, they employ increasingly human resources in coming years.  This
results in high cost and overstaffing.
The third reason is bureaucratic behaviours and corruption issues.  As a normal
practice, most directors and high ranking official from central agencies use their
power to influence the recruitment process in order to recruit their friends and
relatives.  Promotion is based, among seniority officials who have the same political
tendencies, on experience in the majority of cases not seriously considering their
competence.
• Low productivity:
As a result of the above-discussed problems, state owned enterprises have low
productivity.  Typical statistics show that the state owned shipping enterprises have
high cost equivalent with 10-12% freight cost as a percentage of the CIF value of
import goods, whereas the world average and that of Asia are about 5,7 % and 7.9%
respectively (VINALINES, 1999).
So the Vietnamese state owned shipping enterprises have faced the same problem
that was stated by Ihedruru (1993) “low productivity and inefficiency of resource and
allocation have been the main feature of maritime industry in these countries”
4.2. Privatisation and efficiency in the Vietnamese shipping industry
Privatisation could not immediately bring up enterprises ´s efficiency, which depends
on a number of factors in terms of internal and external considerations. However,
privatisation, which introduces market liberation, can lead to opportunities in which
enterprises remedy the deficiency and improve their performance.
4.2.1 Cost benefits
First of all, by privatisation an enterprise can eliminate the so called, cost of public
decision making.  As mentioned above, in state owned shipping enterprises, there is a
lot of interference and dependence on higher level of controlling agencies.  Besides
their core business, state owned enterprises have to satisfy those conflicting interests
and political pressures which are impossible to settle except by compromises, which
reduce the state owned enterprise’s achievements.  The governmental agencies
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seemingly try to remedy uncertainties by passing the problems to an state owned
enterprise with unclear directives.  So, by changing the owner ship, shipping
enterprises can avoid creditable costs.
Second, another cost that can be reduced by privatisation is corruption.  In
Vietnamese state shipping companies, corruption can exist in various forms.  Mostly
corruption is bribery for procurement. It simply represents a surcharge on
procurement costs.  Moreover, bribery becomes more harmful when it results in
procurement of substandard equipment or less productive assets.  Privatisation can
reduce corruption by introducing an incentive structure that will make the obstructive
types of corruption unprofitable. On the other hand, in joint stock companies
employees can clearly enjoy their efforts but directly suffer by their faults. Due to the
nature of joint stock enterprises, as share holding entities, they can offer a stricter
financial control in order to keep transparent financial status and attract more
opportunities to develop. So, privatisation can be an effective medicine for the
chronic disease- corruption.
In consequence, private sectors can work more profitably than public sectors (Lesser,
1990).
4.2.2 Improved management
In consideration of the above problems privatisation introduced, joint stock
companies can overcome the problem in such aspects as:
• Multiple objectives: As a prevailing phenomenon, formulating objectives badly
influence state owned enterprises much more than joint stock companies because
joint stock companies rarely make decisions beyond their finance and operation.
Joint stock companies are more flexible and dynamic in response to market
changes.
• Planning: poor planning can be remedied in the sense that joint stock companies
can attract experts and experienced staff in the work of the planning division.
• Appropriation finance: the joint stock companies do not confront with the
problem of poor appropriation of finance in the sense that they have more
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autonomy in raising loans or finding means of self-financing.  In terms of
planning finance, joint stock companies can easily employ professional expertise
and reduce deficiencies, which state owned enterprises are not able to do due to
cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures.
• Monitoring system: joint stock companies fully operate under discipline of debt
market.  The managers of joint stock companies are always put under threat of
bankruptcy if they lose their control on operations.  So, the function of
monitoring is particularly a concern and improvement in joint stock companies.
As a result, in joint stock companies the operational and decision-making
procedure is simple, transparent and flexible.  On the other hand, the top
management has power to make their decisions workable and the managers are
absolutely responsible for their decisions.
• Marketing: The work of the marketing division is more effective and efficient in
joint stock companies because of following reasons.  First, joint stock companies
easily offer more attractive employment terms to recruit good sales managers.
This leads to increase in the number of qualified staff deployed in marketing.
Second, joint stock companies can simply set up and implement the basis for
staff remuneration according to their efforts and results.  This regime motivates
qualified staff to seek ways to carry as much cargo as possible at the least cost.
• Human factor: Under competitive market economy, privatisation is the best way
in which human resources can be employed effectively and efficiently.
Employees can clearly find their benefits through their attempts by owning
certain shares of the enterprise.  Employee rights and profits, which are related to
the enterprise, will prompt employees to devote their competence to the
enterprise.  So employees try to do best in their daily work.  Joint stock
companies can also have relevant methods to attract high skilled employees by
employment and wage incentives.  As shipping is an international business which
needs proper and creditable know how from foreign partners. Privatisation,
which attracts foreign investors, can introduce valuable knowledge and
techniques in shipping practice.
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4.2.3 Encouraged competition
• The implication of privatisation in state owned shipping enterprises brings new
participants, which increases the level of playing field in the shipping market.
The impact of it is that only shipping operators who present good services with
low rates from a customer’s point of view and low operation costs from a
shipping operator’s point of view survive in the competitive market.  In turn, it
forces all participants, especially state owned enterprises, to improve their
performance.  Jian (1997) stated privatisation is one of the effective ways to
prompt competition and hence transformation from planned economy to market
economy.
• In particular, privatisation in Vietnam is in the beginning phase, not matured yet,
so, it normally applies to small and medium scale enterprises, which have less
cost and risk.  It generates small and medium private entities, which have
comparative advantage in coastal shipping.  A result of the Japanese expert team
study shows that private operators have profitability even in coastal shipping
(MOTC & JICA, 1997).  Their profitability is achieved by performing with less
overhead costs and presenting the superior level of service offered, which not
only attracts customers but also enables them to charge premium freight rate.
Figure 6: The effectiveness of privatisation under competitive market economy
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4.3 GEMADEPT is an example of an efficient privatised-enterprise
4.3.1 Background of company and privatisation process
General Forwarding and Agency Company (GEMADEPT) was founded in April
1991 and privatised (equitised) in September 1993.  Acting as ship agent and freight
forwarder, GEMADEPT is a medium-scale company worth equity equivalent with
USD 1,040,000 at the time of privatisation.  There were some advantages for
GEMADEPT at the time it was privatised:
• Efficient , young and ambitious staff (90 % under 40 years old)
• Top managers were experienced and had expertise in shipping
• Available and reasonable market and cargo reservation.
Some key indicators of privatisation in GEMADEPT:
• Ownership: State share is 18%, employee is 33.8 % and Outside investors is
48.2%
• Privatisation took 18 months.  It is definitely a relatively short time for
privatisation process in Vietnam when it is necessary to consider an average time
equivalent to 27 months according to a case study of the Central Enterprise
Reform Committee before 1996, associated with World Bank for privatisation of
state owned enterprises.
4.3.2 The impact of privatisation
After privatisation of GEMADEPT, the figures show its improved efficiency.
Table 14: Financial indicators of GEMADEPT
Before privatisation After privatisation
Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Turn over (USD
million)
1.14 1.65 2.34 4.52 6.55 8.17 9.17
Profit  (USD million) 0.26 0.26 0.69 1.142 1.525 1.682 1.84
Average wage (USD) 86 90 116 171 229 241 232
(Source: Economic Board of Ho Chi Minh City Communist Party, 1999)
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According to the above table, there are continuous remarkable progresses in
GEMADEPT performance.  After privatisation GEMADEPT has had increased
average percentage of turnover, profit and wage, 43%, 43 % and 22% respectively.
Figure 7: Financial indicators of GEMADEPT based on the data in Table 14.
The profitability of GEMADEPT can be clearly seen in comparison with that of
VINALINES, in which GEMADEPT is a member company, and with that of
SAIGON SHIP.  Informatively SAIGON SHIP is planned to be privatised in the year
2000.  In Annex 2, the background of such companies and their financial statement
are included.
Table 15: Return of equity of GEMADEPT, VINALINES and SAIGON SHIP
1995 1996 1997 1998
ROE of GEMADEPT 27.8 24.9 21.5 19.1
ROE of VINALINES 10 9.1 8.3 9.2
ROE of SAIGON SHIP - 5.4 4.1 2.4
(Source: VINALINES, 2000)
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Direct impact of privatisation in GEMADEPT:
Based on direct flow calculation from financial statements of GEMADEPT, the
direct impact of privatisation is illustrated in the following:
• Employment: the workforce in GEMADEPT has increased by 64 percent since
privatisation, largely as a result of expansion of enterprises privatised during
1995-1998.
• Value added: GEMADEPT improved its productivity and efficiency in
comparison with other state owned enterprises in the same segment as shown
below:
Table 16: Added value of GEMADEPT after privatisation
Added Value (USD) Added Value per employee
(USD/employee)
 Name
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
GEMADEPT 198084 2243762 2464044 8069 7817 7773
SAIGONSHIP 834192 734424 561115 1418 1350 1320
4.3.3 The implication of privatisation in GEMADEPT
• Some lessons from GEMADEPT: GEMADEPT is a typical example of
achievement of privatisation due to several reasons.  It appears to be financially
healthy from the beginning of privatisation.  It draws a sound business plan and
an appropriate company statute.  Furthermore, the management team includes
young, motivated, dynamic and expert staff.  All these factors actually attract
investors. In fact, when the enterprise launched the privatisation plan and offered
its shares to the public there was a positive response from employees and outside
investors.
• The implication of privatisation in GEMADEPT:
• Employee  & management incentives: The changing of ownership from state
to employees is a breakthrough in employee incentive policy.  Employees
become fond of the company business and are motivated by owning some
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shares.  In respect of management, the competition among staff is a
consequence of managers ´s effort to be the best beside looking for more
employment, and improving their business and customer service in order to
keep their company to survive.
• Organisational structure reforms: There was a significant change in
organisational structure in respect of strategic planning.  The innovation in
structure of the organisation, which aims at strengthening the structure and
improving its performance, brings about more efficiency and
competitiveness.  The planning division undertakes traffic forecasting, market
research and strategy for cost control.  This division makes the vision of the
enterprise clear.
• In terms of customer considerations, the marketing service was set up to
maintain good customer relations.  It follows effective procedures for the
speedy settlement of customer claims for delays or damage to cargo.  It also
takes care of business strategy.  Especially, assessment of profitability takes
into account the effect of customer characteristics on revenue potential.
Figure 8: The organisational chart of GEMADEPT before privatisation
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Figure 9: The organisational chart of GEMADEPT after privatisation
• The state-share is not prevailing in percentage comparison with non-state shares.
This brings GEMADEPT some advantages in terms of operational expansion.
Clearly the agreement between management board and shareholders for
transferring profit to equity to expand business is easier in non-state shareholders.
In fact, there were tremendous dividends converted to equity in the good business
cycle, before the Asian crisis, which rapidly increased its equity.
• Outsiders hold the majority of shares.   Most of the outsiders are individuals
working in the maritime field, or permanently in state owned enterprises.
Although the old management board was basically kept after privatisation, the
dominant participation of outsiders has required high expectations in terms of
operation and urged it reform a lot. Especially, among outsiders are key officials
in the Vietnamese maritime industry. They can actually put important influences
to its strategic plan in the form of informative consultants.
• The changing of ownership also changes working culture and psychological
inducement of promotion.  Employees focus on result of work rather than
working time.  Promotion is based on competence rather than experience.
Management
Board
Planning division
Operation Computer
Service
Technical
Maintenanc
Staff
training
Marketing
Business Accounting Technical
Maintenance
45
• Autonomy: The top managers manage the enterprise in almost independent ways.
The liberation of financial planning and loan arrangement brings flexibility in
business operations. The company shows they are sensitive and active in
confronting the changing market such as the changing of import and export
segments, and participation of new shipper.  As a result, the company ´s
competitiveness increases.
4.3.4. The constraints during privatisation of GEMADEPT
• The privatisation process of GEMADEPT has experienced multiple and
cumbersome procedures.  Although privatisation in GEMADEPT took place
under advantageous conditions and in a short time, the drawbacks of lengthy and
cumbersome privatisation procedures have had a negative impact on the firm’s
operation and employees ´ creditability to privatisation.  In fact the privatisation
process was delayed by the controversial arguments among controlling and
consulting agencies dealing with privatisation matters, such as enterprise value.
In respect of psychological considerations, employees doubted the privatisation
plan.  More or less, it ultimately had an impact on the employee’s productivity
and the employee ´s supports to privatisation at that time.
• Difficulty after privatisation: GEMADEPT, being one of the first generation
privatised enterprises, has been confronted with the problem of lack of
knowledge of joint stock companies in administrative and financial bodies,
which prompted obstacles due to legal procedures.  There is lack of relevant
recommendations in decree/ directive for privatisation in terms of extending the
scope of joint stock companies.  Ultimately, it failed to register two member
companies, whose proposed establishment aimed at diversification of its
business, looking for new revenues and reducing risks.  The inconsistency in
policy interpretation between central and local administration toward joint stock
companies created difficulties in business practice.
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Chapter 5 
Privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry
5.1 Current privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping
5.1.2 Current trends
• State owned enterprises belong to the central government :
This sector plays an important role in the Vietnamese shipping market.  Regarding
ship-owner category, this sector occupies 80% tonnage of the Vietnamese fleet.
Privatisation began in 1993 starting with GEMADEPT-a non-vessel operator.  But,
by 1998 thanks to the wide spread privatisation plan of the government, the
privatisation programme has been widely applied in this sector.  Mostly, it has been
successful in non -ship owner operators.
Table 17: List of privatised companies
Company Type of company Equity up to
Jan 2000 (USD
thousand)
Percentage of
State shares
(%)
Year of
privatisation
GEMADEPT Agency & Forwarding 6240 18.2 1993
INFACO Forwarding 357 20 1999
INLACO Crew management and
shipping
250 30 1999
SAFI Agency &  Forwarding 406 15 1998
VICONSHIP-
SAIGON
Forwarding 2 142 30 1999
TRANSIMEX Forwarding 1 040 10 1999
(Source: MOTC, 2000)
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Most enterprises show to be profitable up to the end of 1999.  The average dividend
is about 16%.  However, in comparison with the first case of privatisation i.e.
GEMADEPT, the rest of the enterprises have modest results due to less comparative
advantages.
The average time for privatisation reduced to 9 months for the companies, which
were privatised by the 1998-1999 period.
In the phase of 2000 and 2001, MTOC plans to apply privatisation largely in the
maritime sector.  For instance, VINALINES, being the biggest enterprise, dominant
in coastal shipping market, plans to privatise the following companies with 30% of
shares for state.
Tables 18: List of companies that will be privatised in VINALINES
Company Equity (USD
thousands)
Company Equity (USD
thousand)
INLACO Saigon 1214 MARISUPPLY 744
VICONSHIP
Haiphong
3714 MASERCO 273
VIMADECO 4401 INSECO 728
VOSA 3714 MITECO 100
(Source: VINALINES, 2000)
• Privatisation in provincially owned shipping companies:
As mentioned in Chapter Two, most of the provincial governments own shipping
companies and being small-scale companies have confronted problems under market
economy.  Privatisation is a relevant solution for provincial governments releasing
their financial burden due to inefficiency.  This sector really needs institutional
reforms but failed in the privatisation program for political and managerial reasons.
First, most of the chosen companies to be privatised have unhealthy financial status
and poor management.  Second, there are constraints from officials at different levels
related to privatisation (political problems).
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5.1.2 Some characteristics of privatisation in the shipping industry
• In Vietnamese circumstances, privatisation implies the changing of ownership
but not changing of the management board.  From privatisation objective
consideration, privatisation programmes mostly encourage employees’
involvement in order to create new incentives to increase efficiency.  The
consequence of it is that employees constitute a major shareholder proportion and
there is almost no considerable changing of the management board.  Although
privatisation brings tremendous forces and opportunities to urge enterprise to go
ahead, the limitation due to the old management board still exists in post
privatisation phase.  So, from the author’s point of view, this phenomenon should
be considered and remedied when privatisation widely stretches out and
effectively influences the national economy in the future.
• Privatisation in small and medium scale enterprises mainly non-shipowner
enterprises: Most privatised companies are small or medium scale in which there
are fewer risks in case of mistakes.  Privatisation in ship-owning enterprises is
too difficult because the category of these enterprises is having high capital
requirement, low marginal profit and low “know-how” in shipping.  It
alternatively leads to privatisation in other companies like agencies and
forwarding companies, which definitely require light capital.
• Insiders occupy the major proportion of prevailing numbers of shares: the current
Vietnamese legislation stipulates that foreign investors can own up to 30% of the
total shares of an enterprise.  However, in cases of shipping privatisation, foreign
investors are rarely accessible and have participated in two cases: TRANSIMEX
Company and VICONSHIP Saigon Company with 5 % and 10% shareholding
respectively.   Although the case of GEMADEPT is a typical example because of
the advantage of outside share-holders in privatisation, Vietnamese shipping is
likely to prefer and reserve a significant percentage of shares for insiders.  The
explanation of this though may be for political reasons, concerning “co-operative
owner right of labour” under the socialist regime.  The concept attempts to
protect employees’ rights but is in conflict with privatisation.  The compromise
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for these matters is to reserve a prevailing percentage to insider investors such as
employees and managers.  In fact, insiders have a limitation in terms of their
managerial and financial capacity.  So, the above practice is not effective in the
privatisation process because shipping is highly capital intensive with high know
how requirements.  In fact, in most cases capital mobilisation from outside is
carried out.  The experience in transactional economies points to the absence of
substantial improvements in the performance of insider-owned firms (Frydman,
Gray, Mhessel & Rapaczynski, 1999).  Consequently, privatisation programmes
in the Vietnamese shipping industry in the future should consider the
participation with an increased share of outsiders.
Table 18: Average percentage type of shareholder in privatised companies
State(%) Inside (%) Outside %
INLACO 30 52 18
VICONSHIP 30 55 15
SAFI 20 45 35
GEMADEPT 18 34 48
TRANSIMEX 10 63 27
INFACO 20 56 24
Average 23.9 50.6 27.8
(Source: MOTC, 2000)
• The privatisation method in shipping: Like in other industries, the privatisation
method applicable in the shipping industry is public offerings with the sale to the
public community such as employees and domestic and foreign investors.  As
discussed in Chapter Three, the method has some advantages and disadvantages.
In the latter section of this chapter, the author will give some recommendations.
5.2  Problems and constraints in privatisation in the Vietnamese
shipping industry
Under the circumstances of broad and wide privatisation in Vietnam, the shipping
industry confronts a lot of problems, which are caused by the characteristics of
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Vietnamese shipping enterprises, the privatisation mechanism and the regulatory
mechanism.
5.2.1 Low market share in market structure
Theoretically, the market structure in which an enterprise operates after privatisation
is the key to the design of the state owned enterprises sale.  The technological
characteristics of the industry, the demand for the service and the legal restrictions to
entry and exit determine the market structure.  Notwithstanding the advantage of
higher demand in shipping services, privatisation in shipping has confronted
creditable constraints.  Shipping is a competitive, international, capital intensive and
volatile business, which requires high levels of expertise.   The low market share in
ocean going shipping is a big obstacle for privatisation in state shipping companies.
5.2.2 Managerial Problems
• The inconsistency in performance of state owned enterprises results in delay in
privatisation.  Due to their running under a planned economy, most state owned
enterprises generally lack a sound business plan, an appropriate company statute.
Furthermore the management is familiar with the dynamics of a market economy.
These poor characteristics of state owned enterprises can not secure the long-term
success of every privatised enterprise.  So, they restrict both inside and outside
investors to respond to public offers.
• The inadequate knowledge among officials and privatised company executives
draw back privatisation.  The human factor is a critical issue to determine the
success of any economic transaction.  However, the fact in some state owned
enterprises is that knowledge among officials about relevant banking and finance
laws and labour codes is very inadequate (Nguyen, 1998).
5.2.3 Financial problems
• The lower degree of development of the local financial sector: The lower
financial capacity of inside investors and the restricted share for foreign investors
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result in the limitation of available capital for state owned enterprise sales.  As a
result, the scarcity of financial supply distorts the price of state owned enterprise
sales.  Consequently, the government can not obtain the maximum revenue from
state owned enterprise sales.
• The absence of Stock Exchange Centre (SEC) makes privatisation slow.   For the
time being, privatisation has mostly been applied to small and medium state
owned enterprises.  In the future, when large state owned enterprises will be
planned to be privatised, the presence of an SEC is essential to facilitate offering
of shares in public; otherwise state owned enterprises can not spread out their
tremendous shares.  Moreover, when large numbers of state owned enterprises
are privatised the demand of selling and buying shares increases, making it
essential that an SEC be established.
5.2.4 Political problems
• First, there is little interest in local authorities to reduce the influence of the
government by promoting a privatisation policy.  In Vietnam, the power
distribution system grants its local party and government leaders considerable
authority and control over a number of enterprises.  So, there is no doubt that
they have an exclusive benefit from state owned enterprises and hence ignore
privatisation, by which they believe they will be loosing their privileges.
• Second, leaders and officials in many state shipping companies have a common
belief that privatisation will remove their personal special interests and
privileges.  This sense particularly predominates for those who are incapable.   
There are some argument against privatisation in the sense that:
• The shipping industry, being a strategic industry, should be in the hands
of the state;
• Poor employees will not have access in the post-privatisation stage.
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5.2.5 Poor privatisation mechanism
1. First, valuation methodology does not reflect the real value of an enterprise.  As
mentioned above, for the time being the traditional formula for appraising the
value of an enterprise at the time of privatisation is:// Adjusted Net Worth +/-
Advantage/Disadvantage Value +privatisation Expenditures//.  Adjusting the
audited net worth and the advantage/disadvantage value are subjective
adjustments, dependent on individual state owned enterprise management.
• Re-assessment of fixed and current assets in current prices depends on the
discretion of experts at the various levels of review.   The absence of more
specific guidelines of MOF on re-assessing buildings, equipment, and goods
results in endless discussions among numerous experts.  In consequence,
negotiated settlements for those problems take time.
• According to MOF guidelines, the performance of the enterprise over the three
years prior to privatisation is compared with performances of enterprises of the
same type that are active in the same economic subsection during the same
period.  This comparison determines the advantage/disadvantage value.
However, these data of other entities are rarely available.  In consequence, it
makes this process very difficult, if not impossible.   In fact, the
advantage/disadvantage values were the result of negotiations between the State
and the enterprise (Webste & Amin, 1998).  So, determination of the
advantage/disadvantage value should be fixed in accordance with the market
value of the enterprise.
2. Second, the valuation procedure is lengthy and ponderous. According to the
Figure 3, the review process takes considerable time at each decision-making
stage.  Further, if there are disagreements at any stage, the submission must go
back to the originator for revision.
3. The governance authority is concentrated in a single person.  Practically, in the
case of privatisation in most Vietnamese shipping companies, one person is
appointed to the two key positions (chairperson of Enterprise Privatisation Board
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and CEO).  As a result, too much power is concentrated in a single person.  The
risks here are that most of the directors of state owned enterprise boards do not
have good competence and corruption is possible in economic activities.
4. Finally, the communication campaign for privatisation is limited.  Although the
government stipulates regulations of public notice such as public disclosure of
information on the enterprise and public offering of its shares, there are existing
limitations on means of increasing the general public's awareness of the process
and benefits of privatisation.  Practically, the disclosures of information stretch
out internally within the enterprise and related agencies.  It results in the lack of
information for outsiders, who are concerned with state owned enterprises.  The
use of public media such as radio, newspapers and television is very rare or
absence.  UNCTAD (1995b) stated that the utmost transparency communication
determines privatisation achievement.   In fact, where public awareness has
developed such as in Ho Chi Minh City, there are positive responses to public
share offerings.  Consequently, the utmost transparency and opening
communication campaign should be considered in order to make privatisation
effective.
5.2.6 Regulatory mechanism
• There are some policies that do not encourage employees’ involvement.  For
instance, regarding share purchase through credit, Directive 44 stipulates that
"buying one share in cash as a prerequisite to getting one share on credit".  This
provision is unfair to employees with no available cash.  Furthermore, according
to article 11 of MOF's decision No.104/1998/TT-BTC "the total shares sold on
credit shall not exceed the shares bought in cash by workers".  This practice
reinforces employees' resistance to privatisation.
• There is a restriction for joint stock companies to access bank loans.  Although
the legal document for privatisation stipulated the equal treatment of bank to joint
stock companies as state owned enterprises, in practice, this provision is unlikely
to be applied smoothly.   When a Vietnamese credit institution considers whether
54
to extend a loan, the first enquiry is likely to be into the value and availability of
collateral rather than the creditworthiness of the enterprise or the prospects for
success or the business plan.   Thus, state owned enterprises may borrow funds
from banks more easily because they are allocated more funds or assets to
provide security or may obtain a guarantee from a government authority.  Joint
stock companies face obstacles in obtaining loans because the law is unclear on
the mortgage procedures applicable to the private sector.   Moreover, they do not
usually have sufficient assets to meet the collateral requirements of the banks.
This obviously affects the efficiency and the implementation of the business plan
of newly established companies.   Major banks treat state owned enterprises
favourably in relation to interest rates, capital and equity reduction requirements,
advance payments, fees and charges.
• There are many elements in shipping business regulations and practices that
discriminate in favour of state owned enterprises.  For instance, article 9 II
Vietnam Maritime Code stipulates that “the Council of Ministers shall specify the
activities in which privately owned Vietnamese sea-going ships may engage”.
Such discriminations prevent the concept of  “pro-business environment”, which
determines the development of private sectors in general and the success of the
privatisation process in particular.
5.3  Proposals  to make privatisation effective
5.3.1 Pre-privatisation phase: Restructuring schemes and training programmes
In most cases failure of privatisation has resulted from poor performance of state
owned enterprises.  So a restructuring package in pre-privatisation can bring
effective privatisation.  There are some forms for restructuring.
• Change in management restructure:
Changes in management policy can lead to effectiveness for improving management
results in declining enterprise performance.  It is clear that under the competitive
market economy, poor management in state owned enterprises significantly
consumes public budget.  As most managers in state owned enterprises know how to
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cope with a centrally planned economy, have difficulty in dealing with the changing
market economy.  Replacing old management teams can bring two positive effects
to privatisation, setting up a newly oriented market management teams and creating
potential shareholders ´ belief and confidence.
• Absorption of enterprises ´ debt:
 In the privatisation process, there were many cases where enterprises were reported
to have financial problems.  The forms of financial problems are long-term domestic
or foreign debts, over due account receivable due to liability among state owned
enterprises and over due fiscal debts.   Such problems create large financial costs or
threats of bankruptcy.  So, by debt absorption method, state can cut such critical
costs and bring opportunities for state owned enterprises to start afresh with a new
balance sheet.
• Efficiency programs to improve performance:
 In this form, the management board can apply relevant solutions to increase
management capacity.  Quality assurance emphasises a strategic consideration.  The
objective of an enterprise should be transparent and workable, cover the enterprise
target, guide the enterprise prospect and cut down the strategic gap.  The role of the
planning division should be raised.  Increasing the competitiveness of the enterprise
should be done by market consideration and customer service, which should be
included in both the strategic and business plans.  Strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats analysis has to follow the change of environment.  Cutting
red tape in the organisation needs to be done by implementing a proper system of
recruitment, promotion and reward in the consideration of competence instead of
experience.
• Investment measures:
In case the state owned enterprise can not carry out its program efficiently, the
controlling agency can help the state owned enterprise by investment measures such
as rehabilitation plan or agreements on financial restructuring tied to improvements
in operation.  The controlling agency can send an expert team to undertake surveys
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of the state owned enterprise status.  The team clarifies emerging issues and gives
recommendations.
• De-investment or cutting the flow of resource for physical capital:
This form applies to state owned enterprises where there are wrong decisions to
invest some assets.  The effect of this is that cutting off wrong investments would
reduce the price that potential shareholder will pay.  Eventually, the precise price
attracts the investors concern more.
• Training programmes:
The problem of inadequate knowledge among officials and executives of privatised
companies can be overcome by training programmes, which prepare managers for
privatisation and upgrade their skills and competence.  The purpose of training
programme makes managers cope with the shipping industry in its new forms.
Training is not only important in terms of implementing government policy at
operational levels but also features strongly in the controlling agency ´s forward plan.
Controlling agencies should also consider management training as a crucial issue and
recommend that the government enact the provision of significant support for
training and education.   The content of training courses should include business
management and administration, marketing, finance, customer service and human
resource management.  Training programmes should be undertaken at all levels of
management from executive board to supervisor level.
5.3.2 Privatisation mechanism
5.3.2.1 Partial privatisation for monopoly sectors
Currently, privatisation in the shipping industry does not touch some monopoly
sectors such as port and ocean going shipping.  But in the privatisation perspective
these sectors can apply partial privatisation such as management buy or contract out.
Under the light of this issue, some aspects can be sourced out on a concession basis
to the private sector, which are believed to be able to handle this efficiently.  As an
illustration, a port operator can contract out partial areas as a container terminal to
foreign operators.  Iheduru (1993) stated this form was considerable for these
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strategic sectors of the national economy.  In the author’s opinion, this practise
brings limited effects in terms of enterprise efficiency because the partial
privatisation form certainly liberates an enterprise from some aspects but leaves
some constraints in existence such as the uncertainty and fear for private entities
about political policies and political influence of other public entities.  However, this
form creates an initial basis of private operation in such monopoly sectors and raises
political acceptability for full privatisation by giving good improvements in
operations.
5.3.2.2  Auction method should be considered
The weakness of privatisation method in Vietnam in general and the shipping
industry in particular is the absence of the auction method.  This method can apply to
small enterprises with two purposes: cutting time of the privatisation process and
maximising the price of enterprise to be sold.  In fact, the public offering applied in
the small enterprises could not be cost-effective.  In such cases the state, by applying
the auction process as a relevant alternative, can maximise revenues and allocate
assets efficiently without dealing with other issues, like investment requirements and
minority protection.  In theory, this transfer can be done through two forms:
competitive bidding or a privately negotiated deal (Lopez-Cava, 1998).  An open
competitive bidding process has the following advantages: First, it encourages
political acceptability because it is transparent and results in the higher price of
enterprise sales.  Second, it maximises revenues for the government by giving a
precise price.  Third, it introduces the enterprise to the most efficient investor owing
to public competitive deals, which all potential investors are able to access.  On the
other hand, when there is enough competition and a limitation of the bidding process,
which attracts one or two buyers only, the negotiated sales are conducted.  In this
process, the privatisation agency reviews case by case proposal and meets potential
buyers.  The main disadvantage of this method is that the lack of transparency might
result in very high political cost: low creditability of public audience and the
possibility of corruption.
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5.3.2.3  Increased percentage of outsider shareholders
 In the consideration of shareholder institution, there is a prevailing inside
shareholding in privatised enterprises.  The suggestion for this issue is to decrease
share holding of the state down to lower percentage and increased percentage of
outside shareholders.  Regarding the former argument, the fact that state shareholder
is passive in terms of business extension, there is reduced flexibility for
diversification in such privatised enterprises.  In fact, when privatisation comes to
maturity, the state shareholding tends to be taken over by others.  The withdrawal of
the state does not mean that the state loses their benefits but it concentrates on their
core function of administration and governance.  Regarding the latter argument,
outsiders have some comparative advantages against insiders.  First, they have
creditable know-how and financial status, especially in shipping.  Second, outsiders
normally have some potential resources before being shareholders so the integrated
corporation can help the privatised companies in sound business practices.  Shipping
is international business so the involvement of foreign partners can give assistance in
terms of strategic and operational businesses.  Participation of outsiders encourages
the changing structure management and corporate culture, facilitates organisational
reforms and puts management board under much pressure of profitability.
Secondly, the fact that there is an identical tendency of privatisation in Vietnam as in
the East European countries where the dominant shareholders are insiders, the
employee ownership has drawbacks because they know how to cope with central
economics but this may be difficult under market economics.  While there has been
no definite answer to the question of less effectiveness of insider ownership, there is
some evidence of less effectiveness from the privatisation experience of East
European countries, where there has been a similar economic situation to the
Vietnamese economy.  In theory, in the consideration of financial resources,
managerial know how and corporate governance expertise, foreign and domestic
outsiders investors have some prevailing advantages to insiders.  The nature of the
shipping business is such that the appearance of outsiders, especially foreign entities,
can make a break through for entering by transferring technology and managerial
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know-how.  In the Vietnamese circumstance, there is lack of participation of
domestic financial investors.  Mostly they are individual investors occupying a major
percentage of the shareholding.  The explanation for this reason is that the
incomprehensive communication campaigns restrict the access of external entities.
In consequence, the increase in percentage of outsider shareholders is essential to
ensure the achievement of shipping privatisation in Vietnam.
5.3.4  Increase communication campaign
The proposal of increasing communication has two meanings: promoting broad
participation and bringing opportunity to overcome resistance.  Two meanings are
interfaced.   The more the people are involved in privatisation, the easier it is to
overcome resistance for privatisation.  As mentioned above there is resistance among
managers and governmental officials but this group represents a conservative class,
which is a minority group, not representing the desire of the large group of labourers.
By carrying out broad and effective communication campaigns and opening debates
the obsolete tendency will be criticised and overtaken.  In consideration of the
drawbacks of communication, the proposal for privatisation campaigns is to
emphasise on utmost transparency.  As an illustration, the sales of state owned
enterprises can be promoted through newspaper articles in the national, regional and
international press giving details of sale, their bids, the successful bids and amounts
received.  The open communication can attract potential buyers, as well as domestic
and foreign investor participation, which may result in high price of state owned
enterprise sales.  On the other hand, using public media as the radio and television
can rapidly spread out information to a wide audience, establish and build up
credibility of the government and procedures of privatisation.  Besides, privatisation
planners and affected state owned enterprises can communicate through workshops
in which all levels of officials are involved in informal discussions.
5.3.3.  De-regulation programmes accompany with the privatisation process
Privatisation should go hand in hand with deregulation.  For the time being
Vietnamese legislation has a lot of drawbacks for both privatisation and market
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liberation.  As mentioned above this problem is likely to be involved in pre-
privatisation, privatisation and post privatisation.  The constraint of legislation
prompts time and cost of privatisation.  As a result, it reduces price of state owned
enterprise sales and gives a negative effect to the result of privatisation.  On the other
hand, UNCTAD (1995a) states that promotion of competition is central to the
success of privatisation.  In my belief, privatisation fails when there are a lot of
artificial entry and exit barriers for private sectors in particular and market liberation
in general.  So, from a market economy’s point of view, deregulation programs will
introduce an efficient and enforced competition policy, which will cut down artificial
barriers and induce a competitive market.  The deregulation programme directly
facilitates ownership transaction and reduces cost and time of privatisation.  In the
Vietnamese circumstance, deregulation should be considered as constitutional
restrictions that impose limits on the foreign and domestic private ownership.
Deregulation programs will cut down such constraints and lead to the presence of a
set of available choices to privatisation agencies.  All the above effects can increase
the price of state owned enterprise sales.  It is clear that privatisation achievement
can bring substantial budgets to the state and make financial systems healthy.  The
fact that there are constraints in legal framework, the financial bodies draw back
from the privatisation process. Deregulation should be undertaken in order to keep
legal documents update with practices.  As an illustration, the government should
consider some provisions about foreign shareholders, promoting purchase by cash
and improve the bank loan system.  Based on the above arguments the author draws
the effect of deregulation on privatisation in the following figure as a conclusion for
this argument.
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Figure 10: The effect of deregulation on privatisation
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 Summary of privatisation in the Vietnamese shipping industry
• In the competitive market economics, state owned enterprises can not perform as
well as private owned enterprises.  The main reason is that under state subsidy
the discipline of market rule can not effect and create motivation for state owned
enterprises.  In terms of generally social interest, joint stock companies, being
efficiently economic entities, can produce much more benefits for society.  In
terms of shipping industry interests, joint stock companies can create efficiency
and profitability in the shipping industry.
• Private sectors in the Vietnamese shipping industry have gradually increased is a
good premise for privatisation.  In turn, privatisation has implied an increase in
the private sector in the shipping industry and created a competitive business
environment.
• By privatisation, state owned enterprise performance can be improved in the
sense that the public budget gained by privatisation can be invested in state
owned enterprise restructuring schemes.   More or less, under the challenge of the
newly competitive environment and the release of state protection for state
owned enterprises, induced by privatisation, state owned enterprises will
compulsorily improve their performance if they do not want to be taken over or
merged.
• Privatisation in Vietnamese shipping is just at the beginning phase in which the
government concentrates on non-strategic small and medium state owned
enterprises.
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• Privatisation is one of the best solutions for the serious chronic disease of
inefficiency in Vietnam shipping entities.
• Currently privatisation in Vietnamese shipping confronts the following obstacles:
First, low market share of state owned enterprises, poor management and
invisible finance of state owned enterprises, which do not attract investors.
Except for the problem of low market shares, which needs long time to remedy,
the rest of the problems can be overcome by a restructuring scheme in pre-
privatisation phase.  Second, there are political constraints as a result of the
nature of a socialist mechanism and personal interests among top management
and provincial political leaders.  Third, the inadequate competence of
management and finance among staff in state owned enterprises are big
constraints for privatisation, in terms of the privatisation process and the vision of
privatised companies.  Fourth, the currently cumbersome regulation system has a
number of disadvantages for the privatisation process and activities of joint stock
companies.  There are long and cumbersome processes and the restriction for
joint stock companies ´ access to bank loans and the absence of the pro- business
concept.
6.2 Prospect of privatisation in Vietnamese shipping
• The companies that the government chose to privatise had some comparative
advantages, which the companies coming late in the next privatisation phase will
not have.  Prospectively, the initial phase of privatisation requires a lot of efforts
and reforms from the state in order to overcome the problems.
• Currently, there is no stock exchange centre (SEC) in Vietnam.  The SEC is still
in the planning stage.  However, in the coming phase some larger state owned
enterprises will be privatised, resulting in high financial acquisition for state
owned enterprise sales.  So, the privatisation achievement in turn depends on the
foundation of SEC.
• The effects of privatisation will be reduced when the essential implementation for
pro-competitive market economics fails.  Definitely, the achievement of
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privatisation depends on privatised enterprise abilities to present efficiency and
profitability.  These performances depend not only on management skills and
starting advantages of chose entities but also on how well the business
environment supports the newly-privatised enterprises.
• Monopoly consideration: When privatisation becomes wide spread and effective,
the issue of monopoly should be of concern, especially in the competitive
shipping field.  Principally, monopoly conflicts with efficiency and deviates from
privatisation objectives.
6.3  Recommendations:
• Generally, privatisation in shipping depends on the government policy.  The
government should maintain and follow strong commitment to privatisation.  By
legislation and public media, the government should maintain and develop a
broad consensus among the parties affected such as bureaucrats, managers and
employees.
•  In order to improve privatisation, the following proposals are presented:
1.  Restructuring schemes for upgrading state owned enterprise performance can
bring precise price for state owned enterprise sales and maximum revenues
for the government.  Training programmes can help controlling agencies to
overcome the problem of human resource.
2. The auction method, which facilitate small-scale state owned enterprise sales,
should be considered as the option for privatisation methods in Vietnam in
the coming time.
3. Partial privatisation, contract out or management buy, can be alternatives for
privatisation in the strategic sector of the shipping industry.  It makes a
premise for privatisation in those sectors when privatisation comes up to a
wide stretch and maturity in Vietnam society.
4. Deregulation programmes accompany with a privatisation process because
privatisation can not be improved if there are a lot of restrictions for private
sector operations, foreign participation and market liberation.
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ANNEX 1
Legal documents relate to privatisation in Vietnam
1. Decree No. 28-CP on the Transformation of a  Number of State Enterprises into
Joint-Stock  Companies dated May 7 1996 (replaced by  Decree 44);
2. Directive No. 658-TTg of the Prime Minister on the Acceleration of State-Owned
Enterprises’ Privatisation Process dated August   20 1997;
3. Decree No. 25-CP of the Prime Minister Amending Some Provisions of Decree
No.    28-CP dated March 26 1997 (replaced by  Decree 44);
4. Directive 20/1998/CT-TTg of the Prime  Minister on the Acceleration of Re-
Arrangement  and Renovation of State-Owned Enterprises  dated April 21 1998;
5. Decree No. 44/1998/ND-CP of the Government on the Transformation of State-
Owned Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies dated June 29 1998.
(Source: Enterprise Reform Committee, 1998)
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ANNEX 2
Key information of GEMADEPT, SAIGON SHIP and VINALINES
I General forwarding and agency company (GEMADEPT)
• Established year : 1991
• Privatised year: 1993
• Functions:
Agent and broker for domestic and foreign shipping lines
Forwarding cargo
• Key indicators from 1995 to 1998:
1995 1996 1997 1998
Employee (person) 210 246 287 317
Equity (USD) 4109000 6121000 7811900 9589700
Turnover (USD) 4520000 6550000 8169000 9170100
Profit (USD) 1142000 1525000 1682000 1840000
Tax (USD) 283000 403750 492595 550500
(Source: Economic Board of Ho Chi Minh City Communist Party, 1999).
II Saigon Shipping Company (Saigon Ship)
• Established year: 1982
• Owner ship: state owned enterprise.
• Functions:
Coastal and ocean going shipping
Agent and broker for domestic and foreign shipping lines
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Forwarding cargo.
Crew management
• Key indicators from 1996-1998:
1996 1997 1998
Employee 588 544 425
Equity (USD) 3700743 3498359 3221510
Turnover (USD) 2430578 1963593 1655683
Profit (USD) 200082 145625 79136
Tax (USD) 121528 98179 82784
(Source: SAI GON SHIP, 2000)
III. Vietnam National Shipping Lines Corporation (VINALINES)
• VINALINES established in 1996 according to Decision 91.  VINALINES is the
biggest shipping entity in Vietnam and includes 25 member organisations in 4
categories: seaports, shipping companies, maritime service companies and joint
venture companies.
• The organisation chart of VINALINES:
VINALINES
Seaports Shipping
companies
Maritime service
companies
Joint venture
companies
Haiphong Port
Saigon port
Quangninh port
Danang port
Cantho port
VOSCO
VITRANSCHART
VINASHIP
FALCON
NORWAT
VISERITRANS
ICDDONGNAI
INFACON
GEMADEPT
SAFI
INLACO HP
MARINA HN
VICONSHIP SG
VOSA VN
VICONSHIP HP
INLACO SG
VIMADECO
MAPETRANSCO
MASERCO
SMC SG
MARINE CONSUL
MARINE SUPPLY
MITECO
INSECO
• GEMATRANS
• TRANSVINA
• VINABRIDGE
• VIJACO
• PHILI-ORIENT
LINES VN
• COSFI
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Key indicators from 1995-1998:
1995 1996 1997 1998
Equity (USD) 123472000 137273640 138739300 137161370
Turnover (USD) 128565000 145376000 156320000 163831000
Profit (USD) 12418403 12567107 11560859 12747266
(Source: Vietnam National Shipping Lines, 2000).
